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BEHAVIORAL PLASTICITY AND THE STIMULUS–RESPONSE
MODEL
The term innate is commonly used to refer to behaviors inherited and not learned or derived from
experience. This definition denies or ignores the inborn components of learning. An animal can
only learn if it already has the components required for learning, e.g., the molecular and neuronal
substrates. Moreover, all behaviors are, to some extent, susceptible to modification by experience.
Hence, no behavior can be strictly learned or innate (Shettleworth, 2010), making this distinction
and the terms scientifically inappropriate to some extent (Mameli and Bateson, 2006; Bateson and
Mameli, 2007). However, given the absence of a better term, it is still possible to find some behaviors
classified as innate behaviors in literature, and defined as “stereotypic patterns of movement
inherited from birth that require no prior experience for proper execution” (Kim et al., 2015).
Noticeably, the concept of stereotypy was arbitrarily included into the definition of innate behavior.
This group includes behaviors as different as escape responses (movements performed by an animal
to avoid a possible predator; Card, 2012), taxes (orienting movement of an organism directed
in relation to a stimulus; Zupanc, 2010), and courtship. What these behaviors have in common
is that they are dominated by innate components and preferences and seem to be stereotypic
and automatic responses elicited by a defined stimulus (i.e., reflexes, senso Purves et al., 2004).
They are considered sensory-motor routines driven by inborn responses to biologically relevant
sensory cues. This is the base of the sensory-response model, wherein the brain only reacts to
external stimuli and the behaviors are the responses (Dickinson, 1985). Although there is increasing
evidence of an active role of the brain with the external stimuli exerting only a modulatory effect in
humans (Raichle, 2010) and invertebrates (Gaudry and Kristan, 2009; Gordus et al., 2015), many
innate behaviors in insects are still described using the sensory-response model. This interpretation
led to some important aspects of innate behaviors being neglected or misinterpreted. Any
behavioral researcher has experienced that these behavioral responses are far from constant among
groups or single individuals from the same species, or even the same retested individual (Kain
et al., 2012; Buchanan et al., 2015). Researchers work hard to control this behavioral variability by
modifying their experiments. Some of these manipulations include only using animals in a certain
internal or motivational state. For example, in olfactory appetitive learning in Drosophila, only
starved animals are used and the length of the starvation period influences the results (Colomb
et al., 2009). Similarly, when using the proboscis extension reflex assay, animals that did not respond
to sucrose in a pretraining session or naïve animals that displayed spontaneous proboscis extension
to water are discarded (Shiraiwa and Carlson, 2007). However, in our efforts to control the response
of animals, we are probably curtailing the repertoire of actions we can observe, thus imposing
the response we want to study onto our results. This increases the probability of that specific
actions occurring and, importantly, lead us to forget the importance of variability for survival. An
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automatic and rigid response could soon be disadvantageous.
What is an appropriate response to a given stimulus when the
animal is hungry may be maladaptive when the animal is seeking
a mating partner or escaping from a predator, and vice versa. The
animalmust evaluate its internal state and the external conditions
before themost adaptive action is selected. The expected outcome
is the driving force that shapes the final action (Heisenberg, 2014,
2015).
The plasticity of innate behaviors is commonly interpreted
under the sensory-response model as the existence of a wider
repertoire of hard-wired innate routines, each being triggered
by a combination of external stimuli and internal drivers. At
least two possible scenarios exist under this view. In the first
one, every routine has its own neuronal substrate. Any given
situation will be considered a new input, activating a specific
network that should inhibit all the other routines and behaviors
to promote the most adaptive behavioral output. This is the
classical view of innate behaviors as hard-wired. In the second
scenario, there are fewer neuronal substrates, and these are
not dedicated each to a specific routine but rather define the
principal features of the behavior. Othermodulatory inputs refine
the behavioral output of the neuronal network, resulting in a
broad spectrum of routines for a behavior. It is possible that
both scenarios coexist. The first one could be possible for very
simple behaviors with relatively little variation in their inputs.
The alternative scenario represents one of the possibilities of how
the internal state or the analyses of the internal state vs. external
factors modulate a behavior. We do not yet fully understand
how internal and external stimuli are integrated, nor how the
networks that integrate those factors interact with the networks
that trigger behaviors. We also do not know what each type of
decision looks like at the neuronal level. It is always a possibility
that what we perceive at an observational level as the activation
of one of two possible mutually exclusive behaviors shares a lot at
the neuronal level with what we describe as a complex decision.
It is in this gap in understanding that I believe we could start
thinking about whether and how cognitive processes could shape
the final action in some innate behaviors.
Drosophila is an excellent model organism for this type of
study. Their small size, their great repertoire of behaviors, and
the availability of advanced genetic tools (reviewed in Owald
et al., 2015; Luo et al., 2018) give us the ability to address
these questions at the level of behavior, circuits, and individual
cells. Current technology allows us to specifically and reversibly
manipulate one or several neurons in living, behaving flies.
This makes it possible to dissect the circuits dedicated to
behavioral flexibility, decisions, and cognitive processes, and see
how different, or not, they are at the neuronal level, and how
common they are for different behavioral choices.
Menzel et al. (2007) defined cognition as the “use and handling
of knowledge, which allows the animal to decide between
different options in reference to the expected outcome of its
potential actions” and provided three essential characteristics of
cognition as part of the cognitive components of behavior: (1)
rich and cross-linked forms of sensory and motor processing;
(2) flexibility and experience-dependent plasticity in choice
performance; and (3) long-term adaptation of behavioral
routines. The goals of this opinion article are to highlight
the already known but underestimated complexity of innate
behaviors and to explicitly associate these studies with the
concept of cognition. Although none of the following examples
fall strictly under the definition of cognition, certain aspects of
the processes leading to the modulation of these behaviors are
similar to the cognitive components of behavior listed above.
In Drosophila, the giant fibers originate in the brain, and
project down contralaterally to motor neurons that control the
musculature responsible for jump–flight behaviors (reviewed in
Allen et al., 2006). A single spike in these neurons is normally
sufficient to cause a fly to take-off, resembling a visually-evoked
escape response. Consequently, giant fibers were considered
command neurons for these behaviors and escape responses as
reflexes. However, research conducted over the last 10 years
indicates that these responses are more elaborated, extending
beyond the Giant Fiber motor outputs (Card, 2012). Drosophila
escape behavior contains a sequence of at least three maneuvers
(freezing, body leaning or leg posture adjustment, and wing
elevation) that end with a jump, but with some degree of
independence between each maneuver, allowing the fly to stop
the sequence if it chooses to Card and Dickinson (2008a,b)
and Card (2012). Each step comprises the addition of new
information, resulting in a more variable and carefully shaped
final action. This means that even in the small temporal window
before a predator reaches the fly, the insect must select from a
wide range of evasive maneuvers. Recently, it has been shown
that looming stimuli (possibly indicating the approach of an
attacker) produce a bimodal distribution in Drosophila escape
response—with either short or long take-offs—that can be biased
toward short take-offs by increasing stimulus speed (von Reyn
et al., 2014). giant fibers are necessary and sufficient for short
maneuvers, while long maneuvers require a parallel pathway.
Linear integration of angular velocity and angular size from
looming stimuli takes place in giant fibers and derives in action
selection (von Reyn et al., 2017). Hence, adult Drosophila escape
responses involve more neural control elements than a single
command neuron, allowing a variety of computational and
decision steps to take place before the evasive behavior occurs.
Another common defensive strategy is freezing, where the animal
remains still, reducing its chances of being noticed. A new
study showed that Drosophila flies adopt a freezing strategy
in a state-dependent manner (Zacarias et al., 2018). For this
study, the authors developed a different setup from the one
used in the escape-behavior studies previously mentioned. Flies
faced 20 repeated inescapable looming stimuli instead of a single
escapable looming stimulus. Under this condition, flies rarely
jumped in response to the stimulus, and most of them froze.
Even the flies that initially jumped ended up modifying their
defensive strategy during the experiment, since the probability of
jumping decreased over the course of the stimulus presentations,
and the proportion of flies freezing increased. The decision
between fleeing and freezing was modulated by walking speed.
If flies were grooming or moving slowly at the time of threat,
they were more likely to adopt a freezing strategy. In this
study, the authors also started to describe part of the network
involved in freezing. Zacarias et al. (2018) perfectly illustrates
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how experimental conditions can promote different behavioral
outputs, and how the state of the animal shapes the final
action. Far from stereotypic and automatic reactions, defensive
behaviors appear to be carefully calculated. In the presence of
a threat, the animal begins a cost–benefit computation (e.g., to
eat or to adopt a defensive strategy). If the threat is near and
inescapable, the fly will freeze or flee depending on the action
that was performing at the time. If it is an escapable threat, then
a visually mediated motor planning will determine the direction
of the escape. Next, if the fly decides to jump, at least two types
of take-offs could be performed, a short one in which speed is
favored over wing stability or a long one that produces a steady
flight.
Perhaps even more interesting is how the presence of
parasitoid wasps affects oviposition in adult flies, as a mechanism
to protect their offspring from a possible future threat. Parasitoid
wasps are not dangerous to adult Drosophila, but upon
encountering female wasps, female flies adopt different strategies
that include choosing food containing toxic levels of alcohol to
lay their eggs (promoting the death of wasps’ eggs and larvae;
Kacsoh et al., 2013), and reducing oviposition rates (Lefevre et al.,
2011). These behavioral switches rely on sight to sense wasps.
Remarkably, the external conditions are assessed in terms of the
danger they represent to their offspring and not to adult flies
themselves. Similarly, by choosing food with elevated levels of
ethanol, the probability of the fly’s offspring being parasitized
decreases, and at the same time if parasitization occurs, the fly
larvae are more likely to survive (Milan et al., 2012). However,
there is no instant benefit for the adults that chooses the substrate.
Interestingly, neuropeptide F (NPF) and its receptor NPFR1 are
involved in wasp-induced ethanol oviposition preference. NPF
and NPFR1 are required for alcohol sensitivity (Wen et al., 2005),
but they are also involved in the representation of the internal
motivational states of hunger and satiety in themushroom bodies
via dopaminergic neurons that innervate the structure (Krashes
et al., 2009). Given the preference-switch between normal food
and ethanol-enriched food, and the known role of dopamine
(DA) in value-based and goal-directed decision-making (Zhang
et al., 2007; Schultz, 2010; Liu et al., 2012; Waddell, 2013), it
would be worth investigating whether dopaminergic neurons are
also recruited in this case.
Interestingly, flies form a nonassociative long-term memory
of the exposure and will lay fewer eggs or choose alcohol-
enriched food to lay their eggs for 24–48 h after wasp exposure
(Kacsoh et al., 2013, 2015). Strikingly, it has been shown that
flies visually exposed to wasps can transmit oviposition reduction
behavior to naive flies (Kacsoh et al., 2015), an interesting case
of social learning (Grüter and Leadbeater, 2014). That is to
say, flies that never encounter a wasp can acquire and use
the knowledge of others to modify their oviposition behavior.
Kacsoh et al. (2015) showed that oviposition reduction behavior
of naive flies (students) could last for 24 h after they were
separated from wasp-exposed flies (teacher), but they could not
teach others. They also demonstrated that learning mutants
were unable to teach or be students but showed normal acute
oviposition reduction during wasp exposure. Visual cues alone
are sufficient for acute reduction in oviposition and memory
formation in teachers, and social-learning responses. However,
social learning requires teachers to have intact wings for students
to learn, suggesting a role for both wings in communication
through visual cues (Kacsoh et al., 2015). It is also noteworthy
that all these learning processes require the mushroom bodies,
structures previously demonstrated to be important for valence
andmemory-based action selection (Zhang et al., 2007; Aso et al.,
2014) and to contain and receive inputs from dopaminergic and
octopaminergic neurons (Zhang et al., 2007; Kim et al., 2013;
Waddell, 2013; Wu et al., 2013). DA and octopamine (OA) are
key modulators of behavior. OA has been implicated in state-
dependent changes in visual processing (Longden and Krapp,
2009; Suver et al., 2012), experience-dependent modulation of
aggression (Bonini, 2000; Stevenson et al., 2005; Hoyer et al.,
2008), social decision-making (Certel et al., 2010), and reward
(Burke et al., 2012). DA is also known for its roles in reward
(Barron et al., 2010; Burke et al., 2012), motivation (Krashes
et al., 2009; Zhang et al., 2016) and, as previously mentioned,
value-based or goal-directed decision-making (Zhang et al., 2007;
Liu et al., 2012; Waddell, 2013; Beeler et al., 2014). Both seem
to be involved in mediating certain aspects of value albeit in
different modalities or domains (Aso et al., 2010; Burke et al.,
2012; Scheiner et al., 2014; Huetteroth et al., 2015).
Curiously, these two biogenic amines differently modulate
phototaxis, in what it seems to be a goal-directed or value-based
decision-making process. Phototaxis seems to be a special case
of photopreference and manipulating the ability of flies to fly
can reversibly shift it from approach to avoidance in walking
flies (Gorostiza et al., 2016). Photopreference can be influenced
by the shape, form, or degree of intactness of the wings, the
ability of flies to move them, and the state of sensory organs
related to flight. Hence, flies appear to constantly monitor their
flying ability, even while walking as these experiments suggest,
and adjust their photopreference accordingly. It is worth noting
that the neuronal activity of dopaminergic and octopaminergic
circuits is indispensable and inducing for the modulation of
phototactic behavior, but with opposite effects, suggesting a
potential role of DA and OA, and supporting the idea of a
value-based decision-making process taking place. In this view,
phototaxis is not a response, but an action selected only in
rather particular circumstances after a central decision-making
stage that negotiates external stimuli as well as internal demands.
When flying ability is compromised, the value of the different
consequences of moving toward light changes and the dangers
become more prominent due to the difficulties to escape; hence,
the flies choose to hide until the danger goes away or flying ability
is restored. Immediately after emerging from the pupal case, all
flies experience a flightless period during the wing expansion
phase. In line with the results above, flies go through a phase of
reduced phototaxis that extends beyond wing expansion until the
stage when its wings render it capable of flying (Chiang, 1963).
The alteration in flying abilitymay promote a shift in the expected
outcome (Heisenberg, 2014, 2015), which would eventually drive
the selection of an alternative, more adaptive action, as seen in
preference suppression assays where air, light, and gravitaxis cues
were paired with aversive stimuli (Seugnet et al., 2009; Baggett
et al., 2018). In those cases, flies learn that cues that usually
indicate an escape route will lead them to negative outcomes
(an aversive taste or an aversive temperature). Noticeably, wing
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expansion in flies also involves a decision process. After emerging
from the pupal case, flies select a suitable perch and expand
their wings, but wing expansion can be delayed under adverse
environmental conditions, e.g., space restriction (Cottrell, 2009;
Peabody et al., 2009). Work in Drosophila uncovered part
of the neuronal network involved in the decision to expand
the wings, and showed the connection with the decision to
perch, which required an assessment of the external factors
(Peabody et al., 2009).
These examples serve to demonstrate how innate behaviors
can in fact be the outcomes of complex modulatory processes,
careful assessment of factors and decisions, and not mere
stereotypic and automatic responses. Through these examples,
we can see some aspects that resemble cognitive components
(Menzel et al., 2007): rich sensory and motor processing
(escape response), experience-dependent plasticity in choice
performance (oviposition), and flexible and long-term
adaptation of behavioral routines (photopreference). In
light of this, I argue that the way we frame and refer to
these behaviors must change. We should think about them as
behaviors dominated by innate components or preferences.
This simple paraphrase can change the focus of the innateness
from the behavior to some component of it, moving also the
preprogrammed conception with it. As mentioned by Menzel
et al. (2007), these components or preferences “seem to be
essentially useful in guiding the animals’ behavior in their first
confrontations with the external world.” Innate preferences
could be extremely relevant in the absence of contradictory
cues. Nonetheless, they are certainly not the only things
determining the final shape of the behavior. When other factors
add complexity to the situation, the innate component becomes
diluted and lose strength, leaving only the behavior “without its
innateness.” Under simple and controlled circumstances (a fly in
a tube with a source of light at one end), the behavior looks like
a stereotypic and automatic response (light is turned on, and in
most cases the fly approaches the source of light). In this case,
the innate component is the only relevant factor for the behavior.
However, in complex situations (the flying ability of the fly is
compromised), other factors become prominent and the innate
component loses relevance or becomes maladaptive. The innate
preference becomes another factor to be considered. I propose
that in that complex situation, a cognitive process is engaged in
the final tuning of the behavior (the fly avoids the light). Hence,
cognition could prevent automatic maladaptive responses
and also help fine-tune “innate routines,” depending on the
combination of external stimuli and internal drivers. We should
carefully consider the cognitive aspect of any behavior we study,
no matter how seemingly dominated by innate components or
stereotypic it looks.
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